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that the efficiency of the legal environment affects significantly firm growth. We show that this
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1.- Introduction.
The relationship between the financial system and economic growth has been
extensively analysed.  Starting with Schumpeter´s seminal paper (1911) the number of
related articles is continually increasing. Such effort to understand the nature of this
relationship has obtained diverse contributions. The older literature found a positive
correlation between financial development and economic growth (Cameron, (1967),
Goldsmith (1969) and McKinnon, (1973)). However, these results have to be interpreted
with caution since the methods and the variables used make it difficult to establish
clearly the direction of causality. Nevertheless, these papers were the first attempts to
analyse the relation between finance and growth.
The second serious effort was started recently by King and Levine (1993). They
perform the first broad, cross-country analysis. They find that countries initially
endowed with a more sizeable credit sector experience faster growth. Levine and Zervos
(1998) introduce the stock market in the analysis. They show the joint, independent
relevance for growth of both banks and capital markets. However, the causality issue
still remains unresolved.
Rajan and Zingales (1998) make an innovative contribution to the field by
focusing on a cross-industry, cross-country analysis. They focus on a rationale for such
a relationship: that financial development reduces the differential cost of external
finance to firms. For that purpose, first, they construct a measure of the dependence on
external finance. They calculate it for a wide range of industrial sectors. The main
assumption is that differences between sectors depend mainly on technology-specific
factors. Second, they test whether industries that are more dependent on external finance
grow faster in countries that are more financially developed. They find that this is
indeed the case.
  On the other hand, Coase (1992) and North (1994) in their Nobel speeches
emphasise the importance for economic growth of getting the institutional and legal
environment right. La Porta et al. (1996,1998) contribute to this debate, analysing the
relevance of the institutional framework in firm capital structure. For that purpose, they
investigate the main features of legal systems in a wide range of countries. They find
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that law origin and enforcement affect financial decisions significantly. Furthermore,
these results have encouraged the study of the influence that structural features can have
on economic growth. Thereby, the newest papers on this relationship include
institutional variables as alternative or complementary possible explanations (Levine,
1998, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998).
The underlying assumption of this new strand of the literature, is that the legal
setting firms face forms a stable or quasi-stable environment. Nevertheless, a look at
national legal sources shows that the institutional environment is continuously
changing. In this sense, Rajan and Zingales (2001) develop a theory of the dynamics of
the relationship between legal structure and economic growth. Moreover, they claim
that the strength of political forces -the nature of government, the degree to which the
legal system permits innovation and the degree to which individual rights are protected-
can explain both the time series variation in financial development as well as cross-
sectional differences. They provide empirical evidence as well.
This paper tries to contribute to this line of empirical research on financial
intermediation, institutional environment and economic growth. We investigate the
effects that economic regulations have on firm growth in order to find the legal
conditions which foster economic growth and financial development. For this purpose,
we perform a cross-country, cross-industry analysis. We will study the legal
environment of some developed countries in order to evaluate their impact on economic
activity. This analysis will account not only for cross-country differences but also time
series variations. As a consequence, we can investigate the dynamics of the relation of
interest as well.
Previous contributions have shown that the presence of a more developed
financial market reduces the costs of external finance and consequently has a relevant
effect on growth (Rajan and Zingales, 1998). We think that a legally efficient
environment and a well protected financial system must have an additional effect on
firm growth. This is the link and interaction we want to investigate.
 To address this question, we use industry-level data from a cross-section of
countries. Quantifying the effects of institutions on firm growth may prove difficult for
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a single country, since investors and firms in a given country face the same legal,
judicial and political systems. Combining data from several countries permits a more
precise estimate of the effect of interest. However, the estimation may be affected by
country-specific as well as industry-specific factors that are ignored by theoretical
propositions. We include country and sector dummy variables in order to identify the
effect of interest without taking an explicit stance about these specific effects.
Accordingly, estimations are not driven by omitted variables.
The underlying assumption is that capital markets are not perfectly integrated
and that firms finance themselves largely in their own country. A similar assumption
has been made in related papers and there is evidence on the existence of frictions in
international capital markets (Lombardo and Pagano, 2000a). Particularly, there is
evidence on high correlation between national savings and investments (Feldstein and
Horioka, 1980), strong home bias portfolio (French and Poterba, 1991) and cross
country differences in expected returns (Bekaert and Harvey, 1995 and 2000,
Lombardo, 2000).
The first novelty of this paper is the country sample chosen and the period
analysed. Our sample includes developed economies for the 1990-1999 period. This
decision is due to the lack of data. Data on economic regulations are scarce. On the one
hand, economic regulations are mainly available for developed countries. On the other
hand, it is difficult to find passed regulations earlier than 1990. Therefore, we restrict
the analysis to developed economies and the period of interest to be 1990-1999.
Nevertheless, historically, it has been generally accepted that the link between financial
development and growth is influenced by the degree of development of the national
economy. Actually, a certain degree of industrialisation is needed for the financial
system to emerge (Becsi, Wang and Wynne (1998)). In other words, the demand for
financial services is a prime driver of financial development (Rajan and Zingales, 2001).
Therefore, despite the sample reduction, we consider interesting to analyse economies
with a similar degree of development to avoid biased results. We therefore investigate
the function of financial systems in developed economies. However, the demand for
financial services is not the only explanation for its emergence; otherwise national
financial systems would present less different patterns among them, than observed. The
complementary explanation is the existence of a structural environment which
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conditions finance development (Rajan and Zingales, 2001). However, a complete study
of the structural conditions remains to be done, partly because of the difficulty in
collecting international data.
The second refinement is related to the institutional variables. The legal
variables have been constructed in order to reflect as carefully as possible the true legal
environment in each country in our period of study. For this reason, we check the
changes and evolution of the main economic regulations affecting firm decision making.
The norms analysed are banking regulation, disclosure requirements, company and
bankruptcy laws, accountancy norms and rules about market competition. The 1990-
1999 decade has been a period of deregulation and opening in product and financial
markets for the world economy, especially for the developed countries. Developments
in the European Union have particularly favoured a dramatic change in market
competition conditions, and have strengthened European financial markets. These
changes have been parallel to legal improvements in order to protect the new system.
The legal innovations were passed by the Single Market formation in January 1993,
although most of them were introduced by 1990.
Previous studies do not take into consideration any legal improvement; on the
contrary, the legal environment is considered as constant or nearly stable. As Rajan and
Zingales (2001) point out, this is not the case since economic scenario and legal changes
are intimately related. Despite the attention paid to legal improvements, the lack of long
time series data together with the fact that in the countries considered the legal
environment is nearly stable, make us consider more convenient not to truncate the
period.
We find that the efficiency of the legal environment affects significantly firm
growth. We show that this result is unlikely to be driven by omitted variables. We also
show that the institutional framework is more relevant to growth in those countries with
less developed financial markets. We find that demanding disclosure rules and banking
laws affect more negatively those sectors which are more externally financed; however
comprehensive shareholder protection fosters the results of those industrial sectors that
are more externally financed.
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The paper is organised as follows. In the next section we review the theoretical
results as well as the empirical evidence on the matter. Section 3 contains an illustration
of the models used for hypothesis testing. In section 4 we describe the data set. The
empirical results are presented in section 5. Section 6 concludes and propose future lines
of investigation and extensions.
2.- Theoretical Background.
2.1. Financial development and growth.
The relationship between financial development and economic growth has been
extensively studied. Postulating a link between financial development and economic
growth entails relaxing some neo-classical assumptions. In an Arrow-Debreu model
with no asymmetric information or transaction costs, there is no need for a financial
system. Hence, it is the cost of getting information and making transactions that create
incentives for the emergence of financial systems. Particularly, financial markets and
institutions may arise to ease the trading, hedging, and pooling of risk, both liquidity
and idiosyncratic risk (Levine, 1997).
A recent surge of interest in the link between financial development and
economic growth has resulted mainly from the development of endogenous growth
models, which raise the possibility of an influence of institutional arrangements on
growth rates. The main conclusions of this kind of models are that financial
development could influence the economic growth rate by changing either the
productivity of capital, or the efficiency of financial systems or the saving rate (Tsuru,
2000).
2.1.1. More Efficient Financial Systems and Productivity of Capital.
One important role of financial intermediaries is to provide liquidity to
individual investors. Liquidity risk arises due to the uncertainties associated with
converting assets into a medium of exchange. Informational asymmetries and
transaction costs might inhibit liquidity; thereby, incentives exist for the emergence of
financial markets and institutions that augment liquidity. Liquid capital markets,
therefore, are markets where it is relatively inexpensive to trade financial instruments
and where there is little uncertainty about the timing and settlements of those trades. As
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a consequence, investment is enhanced (Levine, 1991). Bencivenga and Smith (1991)
show that financial intermediaries, by allocating funds to more illiquid and productive
assets and reducing the premature liquidation of profitable investments, could enhance
the productivity of capital, and thus the growth rate. Banks can also increase investment
and accelerate growth by reducing informational asymmetries and eliminating liquidity
risk (Bencivenga and Smith, 1991).
Besides reducing liquidity risks, banks can diversify risks and therefore induce a
portfolio shift towards projects with higher expected returns (Saint-Paul, 1992;
Devereux and Smith, 1994; Obsfeld, 1994), thus improving resource allocation (Sirri
and Tufano, 1995). Apart from this link between risk diversification and capital
accumulation, risk diversification can also affect technological change. Investing in
innovation is risky, although successful innovations obtain exceptional profits. The
possibility of holding a diversified portfolio reduces risk and encourages investment in
growth-enhancing innovative activities (King and Levine, 1993).
A financial system is efficient when it allocates funds to those projects with the
highest marginal product of capital. However, this process is costly. First, in order to
find the most profitable project, financial systems need to monitor or screen alternative
projects. Even if high-return projects are detected, their possible high risks might
discourage single individuals from investing. Thus, in addition to the monitoring
function, financial systems must play a role of risk sharing as well. Therefore, financial
intermediaries and markets, which are better at selecting investment opportunities will
induce a more efficient allocation of capital and faster growth (Greenwood and
Jovanovic, 1990).
The role of pooling rate-of-return and liquidity risks can also be played by
security markets, especially stock markets. Henceforth, the introduction of a liquid stock
market could enhance the productivity of capital in the same way that financial
intermediaries can (Levine, 1991). Portfolio diversification via stock markets might
have an additional growth-encouraging effect, by increasing specialisation of firm
production (Saint-Paul, 1992), since such diversification may reduce sector risks. If
production externalities are present, more specialisation improves capital productivity
and accordingly long-term economic growth rate  (Romer, 1986).
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With regard to the stock market, several papers have shown a positive relation
between its size and the floating decision of firms, due to incentive generation and the
emergence of positive externalities (Subrahmanyan and Titman, 1999, Pagano, 1993).
Pagano (1989) and Pagano and Roëll (1996) claim that the more developed markets are,
the more liquid they are, since participation costs are less important and shareholders
are better protected. Therefore, a positive relation is expected between capitalisation and
turnover and floating capital. Both effects are closely related to the public information
level in the markets. On the one hand, when information is public, its cost decreases,
investment profitability increases, and consequently investors are encouraged to invest
(Subrahmanyan and Titman, 1999), that is to say, the more information, the more the
incentives to float. In addition to this, stock markets may also influence the acquisition
and dissemination of information about firms. Moreover, this improved information
should foster resource allocation with corresponding implications for economic growth
(Merton, 1987).
2.1.2. The Effect on the Saving Rate.
There are at least four routes through which financial development could affect
saving rates: idiosyncratic risks, rate-of-return risks, interest rates and liquidity
constraints (Tsuru, 2000). The effects are proved to be ambiguous. First a decrease on
idiosyncratic risks may lower the level of savings and hence the growth rate (Leland,
1969; Sandmo, 1970; Kimbal, 1990 and Caballero, 1990). Devereux and Smith (1994)
introduce international capital markets and show that if national risks are shared
internationally, growth may be lower than otherwise. Furthermore, when rate-of-return
risks are diversified, saving and growth rates might decrease if relative risk aversion
exceeds one.
Although liquidity has a positive effect on investment, there is ambiguous
evidence on the effect on saving rates. It is generally accepted that greater liquidity
increases investment returns and lowers uncertainty, but the effect of higher returns on
saving rates is ambiguous due to income and substitution effects. Hence, saving rates
could fall enough, so that growth decelerates with greater liquidity (Jappelli and Pagano,
1994).
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Summing up, in an endogenous growth framework, financial development can
promote economic growth via its positive impact on capital productivity and the
efficiency of financial systems in converting financial resources into real investment.
Nevertheless, its effect on the saving rate is ambiguous and could affect the growth rate
negatively. In net terms, the impact on welfare is likely to be positive, since increased
efficiency of investment in the long term can offset any reduction in the propensity to
save (Tsuru, 2000).
 2.2. Legal environment and growth.
Banking regulation is mainly justified to protect small shareholders who have no
access to information (Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994) and to set up a security belt for the
banking system so as to avoid a fall in the system and the negative externalities
associated (Freixas y Rochet, 1997). Therefore, the equilibrium results from the
interaction of public regulation and the reaction of all agents involved: regulators and
regulated entities (firms and households).
Banking regulations are formed by prudential norms, which are barriers to enter
certain activities (narrow banking) and measures to seek optimal bank strategic choices,
such as capital requirements, closure policy, accounting rules and the like (Bhattacharya
and Thakor, 1993), thus reducing competition. The former are direct regulations and the
latter indirect regulations. Moreover, deposit insurance is generally adopted, although
insuring deposits is said to increase bank risk-taking  (Gennote and Pyle, 1991). Hence,
banking regulation strongly stresses bank solvency. It is primarily designed to prevent
moral hazard in banking (Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994).
Moreover, rate controls, entry restrictions, charter limitations of banks and
separation of commercial and investment banking have been widely used by regulators
to limit competition (Matutes and Vives, 1995). Competition has traditionally been
considered a source of excessive risk taking in banking. In this sense, some
governments have even encouraged collusive agreements between banks. Indeed, recent
empirical research on European banking highlights the importance of imperfect
competition in the sector (Neven and Röller, 1994).
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Conventional wisdom suggests that any departure from perfect competition in
the credit market brings about inefficiencies that would harm firms´ access to credit,
thus hindering growth. Pagano (1993) shows this effect in a simple endogenous growth
model. However, some recent contributions have pointed out that banks with monopoly
power have greater incentives to establish lending relations with their clients. Suarez
(1993b) develops a model which shows that banking regulation that creates barriers to
entry will protect and enhance the exercise of monopoly power. In this sense, Caminal
and Matutes (1997) find that total loans are related to market power as well. Under
asymmetric information, banks optimally choose between restricting the loan size or
monitoring firm decisions. Loan size decreases with market power but the incentive to
exert monitoring effort increase. Henceforth, unless monitoring costs are prohibitively
high, their model suggests that some market power enhances welfare. That is, a certain
degree of market power is likely to reduce the expected lending rate and extend credit
since it increases the probability that loans will take the form of information based
credit as opposed to transactions based credits. As a consequence, the effect on growth
is ambiguous.
With respect to investor protection, theoretical predictions are diverse. On the
one hand, strict creditor protection leads to cheaper credit. Consequently, as pointed out
by Padilla and Requejo (1998), many valuable investment projects, which would not be
funded because of moral hazard problems, may be financed. Additionally, firm growth
may improve. Apart from this ex ante increasing efficiency of credit markets, strict
protection of creditors also raises efficiency ex post. When borrowers can decide on
reorganisation without creditor consent, liquidation may not take place even when it is
efficient. Therefore, strict protection of creditor rights to be repaid with absolute priority
eliminates the possibility of this kind of ex post overinvestment problem (Gertner and
Scharfstein, 1991).
However, there are other theories (Critical theories) that consider that strict
enforcement of creditor rights may lead to inefficiencies both ex ante and ex post.
Collateral rights might lead to underinvestment in project evaluation by banks (Manove,
Padilla and Pagano, 2000), that is, collateral repossession may cause the decrease of
project control by lenders (Bebchuk and Fried, 1996). Consequently, many unworthy
projects may be funded and bankruptcy cases will increase.  In case of default, if
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creditor rights are strictly enforced, they will have no incentives to allow their debtors to
restructure financially. Therefore, creditor protection effects on firm growth are
ambiguous.
Theoretical literature has analysed the effects of shareholder rights on economic
growth as well. Shareholder rights are related to capital market development. Grossman
and Hart (1988) point out the relevance of residual power of investors (guaranteed by
legal framework) in order to partly mitigate distortion practices from insiders. Legal
protection of shareholders makes expropriation practices less efficient. As investor
protection improves, the insiders must engage in more distorted and wasteful diversion
practices (La Porta et al., 1999c). When investors are protected from expropriation, they
pay more for securities, making this form of external finance more attractive for
entrepreneurs, who will issue more securities. Therefore, shareholder protection
encourages the development of equity markets measured by the valuation of firms,
listed companies and the rate at which firms go public (La Porta et al. 1999b).
A positive relation between shareholder protection and corporate valuation has
been shown recently through different modelling (Gorton and Schmid, 1996 and La
Porta et al. 1999b). However, there is another effect which the literature has overlooked:
the quality of legal protection also shapes the shareholder incentives to monitor.
Therefore, shareholder protection can be counterproductive due to indirect effects on the
behaviour of managers, that is to say, can affect manager´s incentives to undertake
valuable projects (Burkart and Panunzi, 2001). Thus the link between shareholder
protection and growth proves to be pretty complex.
 With regard to disclosure requirements conclusions are linked to the investment
enhancement and stock markets as well. When information is public, its cost decreases,
investment profitability increases, and consequently investors are encouraged to invest
(Subrahmanyan and Titman, 1999), that is to say, the more information, the more
incentives to float, as investors are willing to invest their money. On the other hand, if
disclosure requirements are pretty demanding, firms can refuse to float in the market to
avoid confidential information disclosure, although investment opportunities might be
negatively affected (Campbell, 1979).
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3.- Empirical Evidence.
Cameron (1967), Goldsmith (1969) and McKinnon (1973) find a positive
relationship between financial development and economic growth. However, this
relationship may be accidental due to the variables used for measuring financial
development. Moreover, this positive sign may not imply causality from financial
development to economic growth, but reverse causality and could be driven by omitted
variables (Rajan and Zingales, 1998).
The newer strand of empirical research tries to overcome these weaknesses. The
first attempt was realised by King and Levine (1993). The main novelty of their study is
the introduction of four new measures of financial development in order to measure this
concept more accurately. These ratios capture mainly the nature and power of the
banking sector through different ratios of credit allocation. They control for other
variables related to economic growth as well, to avoid bias in the relation. They have
data on 77 countries for the period 1960-1989. They find statistically and economically
significant coefficients of financial development on the different economic growth
indicators used. Henceforth, this study eliminates some of the previous weaknesses.
However, there still remain some drawbacks.
On the one hand, they do not examine carefully the role of productive growth
and the rate of investment. On the other, they only focus on the relevance of banking
sector on economic growth. Jappelli and Pagano (1994) and Levine and Zervos (1998)
try to take into account the importance of other financial sources. The former analyses
household credit markets and finds a negative relation as predicted in their theoretical
model. The latter studies both stock market development and banking development and
economic growth over the period 1973-1993. Even after controlling for many factors
related to long- run economic growth, their measures of stock market liquidity and
banking development were positively and robustly correlated with future rates of
economic growth, capital accumulation and productivity growth. Moreover, they find
no evidence that stock market size, international integration and stock return volatility
are robustly linked with growth indicators. In addition to this, none of the financial
indicators were closely correlated with private savings rates. Their conclusions put in
evidence the different function traditionally attributed to stock markets and banking
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sector. However, the results obtained may be driven by the different quality of the
financial indicators.
In connection to the causality tests, results are not conclusive. As Rajan and
Zingales (1998) point out, financial development may be a leading indicator rather than
a causal factor. In order to solve this weakness, they take a different and innovative
approach, focusing on a more disaggregated relationship between finance and growth.
First, they construct a measure of the dependence on external finance of industrial
sectors in the US. Second, they test whether industrial sectors that are more dependent
on external finance according to their measure, develop disproportionately faster in
those countries that are more financially developed. They find that this is true in a large
sample of countries over the 1980s. They also show that this result is unlikely to be
driven by omitted variables, outliers, or reverse causality. Thus they provide robust
evidence that confirms the overall importance of financial development on growth.
Another strategy for the issue of causality is the use of instrumental variables
which are used for controlling the simultaneity bias that may arise from the joint
determination of financial development and growth. Recently, legal and institutional
variables have been introduced in this analysis successfully, since they capture the
different nature of national financial systems. As Carlin and Mayer (1998) emphasise a
central issue in this debate is whether stock markets or banks are more appropriate for
promoting economic development. They take Rajan and Zingales (1998) approach as
starting point and introduce in the analysis the legal structure of financial systems as
developed by Laporta et al (1997,1998), particularly investor protection and legal
enforcement, to study the relationship between financial market features and economic
growth. They conclude that financial, corporate and legal structures do bear an
important relation to industrial characteristics, and that their effects on activity are
sensitive to different stages of economic development.
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) provide another micro-level support for
the proposition that financial and legal development facilitate economic growth,
although their variables and data are different. They estimate a predicted growth rate if a
firm depends on retained earning and short-term credit only. Then they estimate the
proportion of firms growing at rates exceeding the predicted rate. This proportion
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should be associated with institutional difficulties for firms in obtaining long-term
finance, and be linked with the level of financial development in each country. Their
main result is that firms in countries that have easier access to external funds grow
faster.
Levine (1998) and Levine (2000) examine more deeply the relationship between
national financial and legal structure and growth. The main conclusions are that
countries with a legal system assuring a high protection of creditors tend to have more-
developed financial intermediaries. Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000) find a significant
positive causal impact of financial development on real per capita growth and per capita
productivity growth.
The main weakness of these articles is related to the use of the legal variables
developed by LaPorta et al (1997,1998). These legal variables reflect the legal structure
of a country over a certain period, generally speaking are valid for the nineties.
However, they are introduced in the regressions for longer periods of time: 1960-1989,
1976-1990 etc. In developed countries, the legal environment during these periods is
assumed to be quite stable. However, this assumption seems to be too strong when
talking about developing countries for the numerous changes in political systems and
uncertainties associated. Actually, the sample used in these papers includes developing
countries as well. Therefore, this link may be spurious as variables are referred to
different periods of time. That is to say, innovations are not included in the study.
The second drawback of these studies is also related to the sample of countries
used. All the studies analyse developed and developing countries together. However, the
relationship between financial development and economic growth is conditioned by the
degree of development of each country (Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990). Henceforth
the correlation obtained can be misled by the composition of the sample, for the large
differences in development between the sample countries. Moreover, the evolution of
the countries included has been completely different over the period.
Both weaknesses are dealt with in the present article. On the one hand, we will
use legal variables valid over the whole period of study, which guarantees an unbiased
result in this sense. On the other hand, we will use countries with similar degree of
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development and evolution. We are conscious that this decision implies the reduction on
the number of countries analysed and therefore the difficulty to generalise the
conclusions. However, it ensures more robust results.
Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) explore the empirical relevance of banking market
structure on economic growth. They use an extension of Rajan and Zingales data set.
They find that concentration in the banking sector determines a general deadweight loss
which depresses growth. However, they also find that bank concentration promotes the
growth of those industries that are more in need of external finance by facilitating credit
access to firms, especially younger firms. We find interesting this use of Rajan and
Zingales approach for the study of the effects of variables not considered until now in
economic growth. Thus, we will use a similar methodology to analyse the influence of
the legal environment on economic growth. For that, we will use a comprehensive set of
legal variables which captures not only investor protection but also banking laws and
stock market regulations.
As we have already mentioned, we will take special care in validating the
variables for the period of analysis and finally, we will limit the analysis to countries
with similar level of economic development.
4.- Data.
In this paper, we test the relationship between the legal environment, financial
development and economic growth. For this purpose, we will use data from the BACH
database1 on 23 industrial sectors on 9 European countries for the decade 1990-2000.
For each sector, we have three observations a year. In order to check exactly the
influence of financial development and institutional framework on growth and not the
reverse relation, we will use the initial data on financial system and legal environment
in 1990. Accordingly, the variables associated to economic growth are the
corresponding average over the period. In this way, we examine the effects of ex ante
financial development on the ex post economic growth.
                                                                
1 Bank for the Accounts of companies Harmonised. European Committe of Central Balance Sheet
Offices.
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4.1. Data on Financial Development.
Financial development measures vary from some articles to others due to the
difficulties of finding data. The generally accepted solution is to use proxy variables,
even though they may miss some of the aspects associated to financial systems. In this
article, we will construct a measure of the financial development from data of the
banking sector, capital and bond market. For the stock market we will use the level of
market capitalisation, which is consistent with the previous literature and captures the
availability of finance in the market. Hence, we will use the ratio of market
capitalisation to gross domestic product in 1990 as a measure of capital market
development2. Data come from the International Federation of Stock Exchanges
(FIBV). Similarly, we calculate the ratio of private credit to the gross domestic product
Therefore, our basic measure of financial development-which we term “findev”-is the
sum of private credit and stock market capitalisation to gross domestic product in 1990.
This measure of financial development resembles the one developed by Rajan and
Zingales (1998). Yet, we are conscious of the limits of this measure, since as previous
studies we do not have data on private equity and private placement of debt either.
Table 1 collects these data.
4.2. Data on Countries.
4.2.1. Macroeconomic and Institutional Data.
The countries included in this paper are all developed economies. There are 9
European countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands,
Portugal and Spain. We also have data on the USA. To capture the economic degree of
development in 1990, we use the real gross domestic product per capita. All data come
from International Financial Statistics and OCDE.
In the empirical analysis we use three measures of institutional quality which are
generally believed to relate to the degree of development. The sources are the country-
risk rating agency International Country Risk (ICR) and Business Environment Risk
Intelligence (BERI). We control for the degree of corruption in the government through
                                                                
2 Stock market data has a problem associated to the volatility of the markets, that is, the capitalisation
ratio can vary significantly from one year to another. We have checked that in 1989 and 1991 and 1992,
the computed ratios for the countries included are very similar. We have run the regressions using the
ratios of these years, as well as an average of the period 1990-1993 and the results are not significantly
different.
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ICR´s corruption index. Lower scores indicate higher corruption. The second measure
for institutional quality is the “index of enforceability of contracts” constructed by
BERI. This index has a range between 0 and 4. The enforceability of contracts at
reasonable costs depends in large part on the efficiency of courts (Lombardo, 2000). We
introduce the index “rule of law”. This ICR index evaluates the legal and order tradition
in a country. This index combines, with equal weights, assessments of 1) the strength
and the impartiality of the legal system, and 2) the popular observance of the law. Table
2 summarises the data.
4.2.2. Legal Data.
We have analysed a broad set of economic legislation to obtain a confident
picture of the environment firms face. However, the choice is constrained by data
availability. The rules we have analysed are merger and acquisition laws, accountancy
regulations, auditing norms, disclosure requirements and banking regulations. With this
information, following the methodology developed by La Porta et al. (1998), we have
constructed several indexes3 to measure shareholder and creditor protection, banking
degree of prudence and protection and disclosure requirements.
The method of construction is the same for all four indexes. Using papers on
accounting and legal reviews4, we define different categories which summarise the
protection to investors, public intervention in banking and the quantity of information
that has to be public respectively, present in the rules cited. For every country and each
category we sum one unit when the feature is present and zero otherwise. Afterwards,
we sum for each index and obtain the result for every country. We have taken into
                                                                
3 These indexes were developed for a previous paper.
4 On corporate law: “European Corporate Finance Law. A guide to M&A and Corporate Restructuring
Legislation” Hawkins and Morton, (1990) and “Law of  Monopolies, Competition Law and Practice in
the USA, EEC, Germany and the UK” Raybould,. and  Firth Ed. (1991).
On accounting: “The European Accounting Guide” Alexander and Archer (1992) and  “European
Accounting”, Blake and Amat (1993).
On banking and financial markets: “The Regulation of Banks in the Member States of the EEC”, Law
Interbank Research Organization (1978). “Banking in Europe: the Harmonization Process in
Establishment and Services”, Moreiro (1992). “El Sistema Financiero en los Países de la Unión Europea”,
Parejo, Calvo and Gutiérrez (1993). “Financial Services in the New Europe. The Comparative Law
Yearbook of International Business, Special Issue, 1992”, Campbell and Moore (1993). "Il sistema
finanziario. Istituzioni, mercati e modelli di intermediazione", Forestieri and Mottura (1998).
“Deregulation of Financial Markets in Japan”, Katayama and Makov (1998). “Banking Act of the Federal
Republic of Germany”, Bank of Germany. “Ley 26/88 Disciplinar Intervencion de las Entidades de
Crédito”, Bank of Spain. “Legal Framework of Credit Institutions and Financial Companies”, Bank of
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account changes in legislation in order to obtain time series differences and not only
cross-country variations.
  La Porta et al. (1998) develop an index for creditor protection and another for
investor protection apart from constructing a measure for the origin of laws and their
enforcement. The creditor and investor protection indexes are developed from
bankruptcy and company regulations. Both indexes, as the authors recognise, are not
complete. There are other laws that affect directly the level of investor protection which
are not taken into account in these indexes. We have filled this gap by analysing
additional economic norms in order to be closer to the true structural environment.
Henceforth, after the revision of the regulations previously cited, shareholder
protection index, which we will call “share”, has 9 categories. Therefore it can have
values between 0 and 9. These categories are the ones developed by La Porta et al.
(1998): mail voting allowed for general meeting; no need to deposit the shares before
voting, cumulative voting allowed, protection to small shareholders, preemptive right to
buy new issues of stock and finally the required percentage to attend a shareholder
meeting is inferior to 10%; and the new ones from merger law: equal treatment to
shareholders, control of directors, forbidden manager protection practices (such as
poison pills). Accordingly, the new creditor index, “cred”, ranges between 0 and 5,
being the categories: “stay on assets” procedure allowed, no priority to other
stakeholders (employees, government or public entities), managers are not allowed to
begin the reorganisation process without the consent of creditors, creditors have the
right to impose an external administrator and finally explicit protection in merger
procedures.
For both indexes higher values are associated to better protection. USA is the
country with the maximum shareholder protection, scoring 8. Belgium presents the
minimum value 1. In relation to creditor index, Denmark presents a score of 4 being the
maximum, and France with a 0 value is the minimum. Panel A and B of table 3 presents
the construction of these variables. Investor protection is important for the economic
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Portugal. “Loi 84-46 L´Activité et au Contrôle des Établissements de Crédit” and “Loi 96-597
Modernisation des Activités Financières”, Bank of France.
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development because it conditions investment and therefore industrial economic growth
(Levine 1998, 2000).
We have also included a variable, which captures the quantity of information
required to public firms: “disclos”. We analyse the need of compulsory disclosure in
four different situations: merger, auditing, deciding to go public as well as the contents
of annual accounts. Thus, “disclos” will range from 0 to 4. Accordingly, higher values
of “disclos” imply more information available to markets and investors. When
comparing “disclos” values, a great uniformity is observed among European countries.
The constitution treaty of the European Community (1952) established the mutual
recognition of national firms. Harmonisation, however, has not finished yet, even
though there are some fields where it has evolved more quickly. Information
requirement is one of the most homogeneous fields.  The main work has been made on
public firm information related to mergers and acquisition of companies, annual account
balance and auditory norms 5. In this sense, Kukies (2000) points out that the success of
European Single market has been mainly driven by better disclosure requirements.
Therefore, disclosure requirements seem relevant for the finance development and
economic growth relation we want to investigate.
Then, we have analysed banking regulation, whose objective is to protect and
assure the stability of such a sensitive system to economy. Following a paper by Allen
and Gale (1995) we have analysed the main features, through ten categories6, of
banking regulation in order to measure the prudence of the national regulation. The ten
categories can be subdivided in 3 groups according to their main goal. The first group
refers to activity control. The second group controls activity scope. The third group
refers to risk control. Therefore, “bca” will range between zero and ten when none or all
categories are present in a national system. Higher values imply tighter controls. Values
for each category and each country are shown in table 3, panel C. USA is the country
where “bca” has the highest value.
                                                                
5 European Interior Market Review 1993.
6 Similar categories have also been used in a study on European banking regulation developed by
Interbank Research Organization (1978). Parejo Gamir (1993) has used this idea of categories to analyse
banking regulation as well.
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With the inclusion of these regulations, we have come closer to the true
institutional environment faced by firms. We are interested in how these variables
condition the relationship between financial systems and economic growth. Variables
are summarised in table 4. We have not included any variable for the origin of the law.
The main reason for this exclusion is legal innovations and reforms. Rajan and Zingales
(2001) point out that legal origin does not have the same explanatory power over time.
Therefore, we are not sure that the legal origin still has an explanatory power, as legal
systems continuously change to adapt new scenarios.
The analysis of the legal innovations in the 1990-2000 period, is especially
relevant for disclosure requirements and banking regulation. With regard to disclosure
rules, it can be observed that they have become stricter for Denmark and Netherlands
since 1993. In connection to banking law, American innovations suppose a tendency
towards higher geographical competition and fewer restrictions 7. The remaining norms
have remained stable since the Eighties. Therefore, in our period of study, the legal
environment is nearly stable. As a consequence, and due to the lack of data, we would
rather analyse the period of interest as a whole than divide it into two subperiods.
4.3. Data on Industries.
  Data on industries come from the European database BACH. Data are
disaggregated in 23 sectors, following the new NACE classification. BACH contains
data from Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal,
Spain and USA. The advantage of this base is that data are harmonised and there is
consistency among them. We want to investigate the relationship between economic
industrial growth and the national financial and legal systems. To account for the
industrial growth we use the geometric average rate of growth of real value added for
each sector in each country between 1990 and 2000. Panel A of table 5 presents this
variable for industries and panel B for countries.
                                                                
7 Geographical controls for branch establishment have been present until 1997. The Riegle-Neal Interstate
Banking and Branching Efficiency Act enables banks to establish branches and buy other banks across
the country. The passing of this act ends a long deregulatory process started in 1978. By 1993, the state-
level deregulatory process was essentially completed: all states but Arkansas, Iowa and Minnesota
allowed statewide branching, and all states but Hawaii permitted out of state bank holding companies to
enter (Jayaratne and Strahan, 1997).
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In addition to this, we have calculated a measure of the external financial needs
“fineeds” for the 1990-2000 period. Data come from BACH again. To proxy for the
external financial needs, we will use the leverage ratio. This ratio includes banking
credit, trade creditors and debenture loans. We are conscious of the limits of this
measure, since it does not reflect all the financing possibilities financial markets allow.
However, due to the fact that we are working with book data and that only large firms
have effective access to capital markets, we think leverage ratio is a good signal of firm
ability to attract external investor to finance firm investment projects.
We will include an interaction term between legal structure and the measure of
external financial needs. We try to check the relevance of the institutional scenario for
the economic growth of financial constrained firms when a large set of economic
regulations is considered. Table 5, panel A collects the financial needs across industries,
panel B reports the variable across countries in the sample. Table 6 presents the
correlations between the main variables.
5.- Legal Framework, Financial Development and Sector Growth.
5.1 The Basic Test.
The first model explores the role of legal structure for industrial results. We
include a complete set of legal variables to capture various aspects of economic
legislation. We are interested in banking and capital markets rules mainly. We correct
for country and industry characteristics using indicator variables, one for each country
and industry. The basic regression is:
Growthj,k= a + ß1*Industry dummiesj + ß2*country dummiesk + ß3*legal variables +  e j,k
              (1)
Where a subscript j indicates that the variable refers to the j-th industry. Similarly, a
subscript k indicates a variable regarding the k-th country.
We estimate the equation for the period 1990-1999. We calculate the growth for
every year and each sector, and then we introduce in the regression the average of the
period for each sector. The legal variables refer to 1990. We introduce dummy variables
for each country and each sector, in order to assure that results are not driven by any
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omitted effect. Furthermore, we run two additional regressions with national variables
which account for the degree of development. In these specifications, we do not
introduce country dummies. In all specifications, we introduce size controls as well.
5.2 Results from the basic regression.
Table 7 presents the results from the above regression. We report for brevity
only the coefficients of interest, namely the legal variables. We compute standard errors
and t-statistics corrected for heteroskedasticity. We have run three regressions. All
specifications include dummies for sectors and size. The first two introduces country
controls traditionally used in the literature instead of country dummies. Accordingly, we
include the financial development index at the beginning of the period to account for the
degree of financial development. We introduce the logarithm of per capita gdp in 1990
to measure the degree of development of national economy in the second regression.
We also use three variables to characterise the institutional framework of countries:
enforceability of contracts (enforce) rule of law (rule) and corruption (enfy).
The result obtained for financial development coefficient is positive and
significant (column 1), therefore better financial systems encourage economic growth.
However, when we introduce in the analysis the per capita income logarithm, the
financial development coefficient is not significant any more (column 2). The per capita
income is negative and significant. Hence, more developed countries present lower
growth. With regard to the institutional quality variables, all of them are significant.
Rule of law presents a positive sign. Therefore, better legal systems foster economic
growth. Enforceability of contracts presents a negative coefficient. As can be observed
in table 6, the relationship between contract enforceability and per capita income is
strong. Furthermore, in related papers, this variable has been used as a proxy for
economic development. Therefore, this negative sign has to be interpreted in the same
spirit as the per capita income one. The more developed countries the lesser growth.
Corruption presents a positive and significant coefficient. Lower values of enfy are
associated to higher corruption. Hence, corruption has a depressing effect on growth.
In connection with the legal variables, shareholder protection coefficient enters
with a positive and significant coefficient, while, banking regulation and disclosure
requirements protection coefficients are significant, but negative. Henceforth, there is
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mixed evidence on the influence that a developed legal environment has on industry
growth. In general terms, sector effects and size effects are found significant sources of
differences in growth.
In column (3), we run the regression with the legal variables alone. In order to
control the fixed effects associated with countries we introduce dummy variables
instead. Again, we also use dummies in order to control size and industry effects.
Thereby, we can ensure that these results are not driven by omitted variables. In this
case, things are very similar. The estimated coefficient for banking regulation is
negative and significant. Therefore, legislation restricting banking hinders economic
growth as predicted by Pagano (1993). The coefficient for disclosure requirements is
negative and significant as well. Creditor and shareholder protection coefficients are
positive and significant. Henceforth, when sector and country differences are considered
results confirm the hypothesis that developed institutional protection to investors
promotes economic development. In this case, both country and size effects account for
differences in growth.
In table 8, we provide a metric to assess the economic significance of the
estimated coefficients in specification (1) (column 3 of table 7). For each country in the
sample, we compute an estimate of the elasticity of the sector growth with respect to
variation in the legal development measures. The elasticity is computed at the average
value of the variables8.
The results show that the effect of institutions on sector revenues is
economically significant. A 10% improvement in the shareholder protection is
associated in average with a 2.80% increase in the results. A 10% increasing protection
of banking law affects negatively economic growth (2.85%). We are conscious that with
this metric we are not measuring exactly independent effects. Due to the correlations
                                                                
8 The elasticity of gi, the real economic growth in country i, relative to the institutional variable INSTj  is
computed as:
hi,j = f
)
j . 
ig
ijINST
where INSTij   is the value of  INSTj  in country i, f
)
j is the estimated coefficient in specification (1) for
the corresponding institutional variable and gi is the average of real economic growth in country i.
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between the legal variables (table 6), we would expect that the “partial derivative” effect
of each institutional variable, controlling for the value of the others, would be smaller in
absolute value than their “total derivative” effects. Despite this lower economic impact,
we consider more important to account for the partial effect, as long as institutional
factors impact simultaneously to economic decision making. The general message from
Table 7 and 8 is that institutional environment affects statistically and economically
economic growth during the 90´s.
5.3. The interaction analysis.
The previous section reported the test of equation (1). We found evidence that
economic growth is a function of the legal framework. That is, the approach outlined
above enables us to identify an economy-wide effect of legal environment common to
all economic sectors and countries. Therefore, this would be the effect we would find if
we studied national aggregated data. Next, we analyse more in detail the role played by
the legal structure for economic sectors through the introduction of two different
interaction variables. Thus we use two new specifications:
Growthj,k= a + f1*Industry dummiesj + f2*country dummiesk + f3* legal
variables + f4* (financial development*legal variablek) + e j,k           (2)
Growthj,k= a + y1*Industry dummiesj + y2*country dummiesk + y3* legal
variables + y4* (external dependencej,k*legal variablek) + e j,k           (3)
In specification (2) we introduce the interaction between national institutional
variables and financial development. We test whether sectors operating in a developed
financial setting obtain disproportionately higher or lower results. As we have
explained, American financial system is said to be one of the most developed in the
world (Rajan and Zingales, 1998) and its legal setting is considered encouraging for
economic activity as well (La Porta et al. 1998). Accordingly, we pose two additional
questions. First, we test what would happen with industry growth if they faced a
developed legal and institutional framework, like the American one. Secondly and
Legal Environment, Capital Structure and Firm Growth. International Evidence
25
complementarily, we test how American financial development would affect industry
growth.
The third specification analyses the effect of the institutional framework across
industries through the combination of external financial needs and institutional
framework. Henceforth, we test whether sectors that are more in need of external
finance, grow significantly more if they are in a country with an adequate legal and
institutional structure. In this case, we also compute what would happen to economic
growth if the legal environment were the American one, instead of their own legal
setting. These computations resemble in spirit what has been done in recent papers by
Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Cetorelli and Gambera (2000).
Table 9 reports the estimation of equation (2). In column 1, we estimate the
equation introducing all interaction terms. The coefficients of the basic variables are
significant only for banking regulation and shareholders protection. With respect to the
interaction terms, all are significant except for the shareholder one. Banking interaction
is negative, hence prudent banking regulation hinder economic growth in those
countries with a developed financial system. Disclosure requirement interaction presents
a negative coefficient, implying that the general depressing effect on economic growth
is more relevant when the financial system is more developed. Creditor protection
indirect effect is positive. Thereby, creditor protection affects growth more when
financial markets are developed. Shareholder interaction does not affect growth; hence
we consider eliminating it. Results are the same (column 2). In column 3, we eliminate
the creditor interaction effect. In this case, the creditor protection does affect economic
growth significantly. In column 4, we present the results for the interaction variables
alone. Results confirm those obtained in table 7, being prudent banking regulation and
disclosure requirements depressing for economic growth. On the contrary, strict investor
protection enhances economic growth in particular where financial systems are
developed.
These findings suggest that legal improvements in creditor and shareholder
protection promote economic growth. Furthermore, these effects are stronger in those
countries with a well-developed finance sector. However, banking regulation and
disclosure requirements hinder economic growth.
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Next, we compute what would happen if European countries had to face
American context. We calculate the impact of each interaction term on economic
growth in a similar vein to the metric used in table 8. For each country in the sample, we
compute an estimate of the elasticity of the sector growth with respect to variation in the
interaction term9. Afterwards, we replace the national values of the legal variables and
financial development for the American ones. First, we introduce the American
financial development alone (panel A). Secondly, we replace the legal variables instead
(panel B). We also compute the difference in growth in the diverse situations. Results
are shown in table 10.
As it can be observed from panel A, if economic sectors enjoyed American
financial development, ceteris paribus, all effects would be more pronounced. However,
as observed in the last column the combined effect on growth shows mixed evidence of
the influence on economic growth exerted by the American financial development. For
some countries, there would not be significant differences between facing their own
national financial development or the American one. These countries present similar
national financial development to the American one (as can be observed from table 1).
These are Denmark, France, Germany and The Netherlands. Austria, Spain and
Portugal, would growth more if their firms faced the American financial development.
Therefore, those countries less financially developed enjoyed higher growth rates if they
had American financial system. However, Italy and Belgium would present a
deadweight loss if their sectors faced American financial system.
In panel B, we replicate the computations, this time with the American legal
variables. Again, slight differences can be seen between the real influence on growth
and the simulated one. If firms operated in their own financial system but with the
American legal environment, the effects on growth would be stronger. Individually
                                                                
9 The elasticity of gi, the real economic growth in country i, relative to the interaction term INTj  is
computed as:
hi,j = f
)
j . 
ig
ijINT
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considered, American shareholder protection would double its impact on growth (from
.248 to .567). The negative effect of the interaction term with banking regulation would
increase from .511 to .731. If economic sectors faced American institutional
environment, they would grow more. Therefore, the main insight of this comparative
exercise is that provided industries face the national financial degree of development,
American legal system will encourage industry growth. These findings suggest that
legal environment is more important when financial system is less developed. Looking
at financial data, we can observe that in 1990 USA presented the most developed
financial system of the sample. Therefore, USA legal framework encourages growth for
those countries with smaller capital markets.
Table 11 presents the estimation of specification (3). As can be observed from
column 1, when introducing all the interaction variables, the results for the basic
variables are very similar to those obtained in the basic specification. However, in some
regressions, creditor protection is not significant. Related to the banking interaction
effect, it presents a negative and weakly significant coefficient. Henceforth, prudent
banking norms whose objective is solvency impacts more negatively more leveraged
sectors. The disclosure requirement interaction term presents a negative and significant
coefficient. Thus, disclosure requirements affect negatively those sectors which are
more dependent on external finance as well. Creditor and shareholder interaction terms
enter with positive and significant coefficients. Therefore, strict investor protection has
a second order effect on leveraged sectors.
Columns 2 to 6 estimate different specifications. In column 2, we eliminate the
banking interaction term. Results for the basic variables and interaction terms hold
except for creditor protection which becomes not significant. If we take our creditor
interaction results still hold (column 3). Yet, if the eliminated interaction is the
shareholder protection one, none of the rest is significant (columns 4 and 5). Finally,
regression 6 presents the results if we include interaction variables alone. Previous
results still hold. Therefore, banking regulation affects negatively economic growth as
well as disclosure requirements. Henceforth, both impact negatively those sectors which
                                                                                                                                                                                             
where INTij   is the value of  legal variable j* financial development  in country i, f
)
j is the estimated
coefficient for the corresponding interaction term in specification (2) and gi is the average of real
economic growth in country i.
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are more dependent on external finance. Furthermore, disclosure requirements have a
negative effect on economic growth (-0.0668) that affects all sectors. Moreover, when
we introduce a measure of external financial needs, we evidence a minor industry-
specific, positive effect (-0.0413). Similarly, shareholder increasing effect grows up to
0.0644 showing a higher industry effect.
The positive effect of creditor interaction term seems to support orthodox
theories. Strict creditor protection leads to cheaper credit. Consequently, many valuable
investment projects, which would not be otherwise funded because of moral hazard
problems, may be financed. Additionally, firm growth may improve. This effect may be
especially important for leveraged sectors.
We have estimated the different interaction effects on growth. In this case, we
compare the interaction of national legal structure and financial dependence (colum1) if
the industry faced American legal environment rather than the national one. Results are
shown in table 12. We compute the difference of industry growth in both situations as
well10. We find evidence that American institutional environment does encourage
growth more than the national setting.
6. Robustness.
     We now present a large battery of robustness test to assure that the interaction
effect we have found is not driven by the sample chosen. First, we check if the
correlation is sensitive to the size of national sectors. Afterwards, we focus on
substantial industries.
6.1. Size analysis.
We have analysed all sector sizes indiscriminately. However, size has been
proved to be an important conditioning factor in economic growth. Henceforth, we
consider interesting to examine if the general correlations found are valid, when
considering particular sector sizes independently. We separate the economic sectors into
two categories: large sectors on one hand and small and medium ones on the other.
                                                                
10 We estimate the prediction including the significant variables alone and introducing all of them. In both
cases, the mean comparison test gets the same results.
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Financial patterns are said to be affected by firm size, since size is a proxy for efficient
past (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). Moreover, reputation may alleviate information
asymmetries and thus can improve access to credit (Giannetti, 2000). Therefore,
focusing specially on larger sectors, we might expect a less important effect of the legal
scenario on sector growth.
Table 13, panel A reports the results for small and medium sectors and panel B,
the results for large sectors. Different patterns appear depending on the size. In column
1 and 2, we present the results for specification 2. The results in both cases are very
similar to the ones obtained for the complete sample. However, banking law affects
positively firm growth for large sizes.
In columns 3 and 4, we present evidence for specification (3). Results are pretty
similar for small and large sectors, but slightly different from those showed for the
general case. Now, conclusions are weaker both for basic variables and interaction
terms. For small sectors, only disclosure requirements and shareholder protection are
significant, being all interaction effects no significant. However, banking regulation and
creditor interaction affect significantly economic growth for larger sectors.
When size is taken into consideration, results show a significant impact on
growth, although they reveal different patterns associated to size specially for more
leveraged sectors. Shareholder protection encourages growth for both sizes. However,
with regard to the interaction analysis, legal development effects are less pronounced
for leveraged smaller and medium sectors than larger ones.
 6.2. Manufacturing industries.
Both theoretically and empirically, it has been shown that there are strong
differences between manufacturing industries and services. Therefore, we consider
interesting to focus on manufacturing sectors to complete the analysis of the robustness
of results. Results are reported in table 14. We find evidence that institutional factors
impact manufacturing as well. Results for this more homogeneous sample mainly
replicate those obtained for the complete sample, except for the more leverage case,
where interaction effects are not significant. Therefore, results are robust to the
inclusion of different activities.
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7. Concluding remarks.
As claimed by Cetorelli and Gamberra (2001), after the contributions that
established that financial development matters for economic growth, the next step in the
research agenda involves examining deeply the reason of this nexus. In this context, we
investigate the effects that legal environment may have on economic growth. The first
question to address is what we mean by institutional environment. We call institutional
environment those legal and compulsory norms that shape and condition economic
transactions. Banking law, disclosure requirements, legal protection to investor and
company law are the institutional scenario considered.
The evidence found suggests a significant impact of the legal environment, say
banking regulation disclosure requirements and investor protection, on industry growth
in general terms. This finding is consistent with the papers by La Porta et al. (1996,
1998) and Rajan and Zingales (2001). There is evidence that banking regulation has a
first-order negative effect on growth. This finding is consistent with the theoretical
prediction that tighter controls decrease market competition and as a consequence the
amount of credit available is lower. Moreover, we also find evidence that sectors
operating in more developed financial systems are more affected by this negative effect
from a prudent banking law, as predicted by Suarez (1993b).
When we examine the interaction between financial and institutional
development, we find evidence that creditor protection affects positively firm growth in
those countries with developed financial systems. This effect is common to all sectors.
This finding supports those opinions that defend strict creditor protection because it
leads to cheaper credit and therefore, more valuable projects would be financed and
results grow (Padilla and Requejo, 1998). Shareholder protection has a general
promoting effect on growth as well. However, we find evidence that shareholder
protection is less relevant to economic growth in those countries with a developed
financial system. Moreover, shareholder protection has a heterogeneous effect across
industries. In particular, we find that more leveraged sector growth is more positively
impacted by shareholder protection.
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In order to check the welfare effects of the national systems, we have realised
comparisons between national legal systems and the American one. Results show that
given the degree of development of national financial system, the American legal
environment promotes industry growth more than the national ones. Furthermore, it
does not seem to improve the performance of those sectors more in need of external
finance.
Finally, our results may be relevant in the debate about what structure should
adopt economic regulations in order to promote economic growth. To the extent that
sector growth is affected by national creditor and shareholder protection laws as well as
banking rules, the adoption of an adequate legal environment may become a
comparative advantage for national industries competing internationally. Especially for
those sectors more externally dependent and when financial markets are small.
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TABLE 1: FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT ACROSS COUNTRIES.
The cred/ratio is the private credit (IFS line 32d) to gdp. The cap/gdp ratio is the stock market
capitalization over GDP at the end of the year as reported by International Federation of Stock Exchanges
(FIBV). Data for 1990.
cred/gdp cap/gdp
Austria 0.74 0.17
Belgium 0.37 0.33
Denmark 0.83 0.28
France 0.97 0.26
Germany 0.94 0.21
Italy 0.40 0.14
Netherlands 0.54 0.40
Portugal 0.47 0.13
Spain 0.70 0.23
USA 0.73 0.48
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TABLE 2: SUMMARY STATISTICS ACROSS COUNTRIES.
Enforce is the “index of enforceability of contracts” constructed by BERI. This index has a range between
0 and 4. Rule accounts for the “law and order” in the country. Enfy accounts for corruption (ICR´s
corruption index) in the government. Lower scores indicate higher corruption. Lperca measures the
income per capita logarithm (data come from IFS statistics).
cntry enforce enfy rule lperca
average 3.30 8.33 10.00 9.96
Austria median 3.30 8.33 10.00 9.96
stand dev 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04
average 3.30 7.84 10.00 9.92
Belgium median 3.30 8.33 10.00 9.92
stand dev 0.00 0.76 0.00 0.03
average 3.18 10.00 10.00 10.18
Denmark median 3.20 10.00 10.00 10.15
stand dev 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.04
average 2.50 8.69 9.52 9.97
France median 2.50 9.16 10.00 9.96
stand dev 0.00 1.40 0.76 0.02
average 3.40 9.30 9.44 10.01
Germany median 3.40 9.58 9.58 9.99
stand dev 0.00 0.75 0.62 0.07
average 2.14 5.71 8.33 9.88
Italy median 2.20 5.00 8.33 9.87
stand dev 0.09 0.82 0.00 0.02
average 3.20 10.00 10.00 9.91
Netherlands median 3.20 10.00 10.00 9.90
stand dev 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04
average 2.00 8.33 8.99 8.92
Portugal median 2.00 8.33 8.33 8.91
stand dev 0.00 0.00 0.75 0.05
average 2.70 6.90 8.57 9.49
Spain median 2.70 6.66 10.00 9.47
stand dev 0.00 1.39 1.65 0.04
average 3.50 8.33 10.00 10.04
USA median 3.50 8.33 10.00 10.03
stand dev 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04
average 2.91 8.31 9.45 9.82
median 3.20 8.33 10.00 9.93
stand dev 0.50 1.55 0.91 0.33
Legal Environment, Capital Structure and Firm Growth. International Evidence
39
TABLE 3:  LEGAL VARIABLES.
Panel A: Shareholder and Creditor Protection.
Shareholder and creditor protection extends La Porta et al (LLSV) indexes for including merger
regulation. We control for specific protection of shareholders. We will sum one point to LLSV
shareholder index, if control of boards of Directors is present (Dir. Cont), that is no restriction to market
mechanism. When equal treatment to all shareholders is guaranteed we will sum one point as well.
Thirdly we will increase the index in one unit more if defective tactics are absent. Creditor index is an
extension of LLSV such that it includes merger protection to firm operations and creditors.
Regulation Shareholder protection Creditor protection
LLSV Dir cont Eq. treat Def tacts Total LLSV Merger Total
AUSTRIA 2 0 1 1 4 3 0 3
BELGIUM 0 0 1 0 1 2 1 3
DENMARK 2 0 1 1 4 3 1 4
FRANCE 3 1 1 0 5 0 0 0
GERMANY 1 0 1 1 3 3 0 3
ITALY 1 0 0 0 1 2 0 2
NETHERLANDS 2 0 0 0 2 2 0 2
PORTUGAL 3 1 1 0 5 1 0 1
SPAIN 4 0 1 0 5 2 0 2
USA 5 1 1 1 8 1 0 1
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TABLE 3:  LEGAL VARIABLES.
Panel B: Information requirements and information quality.
Diclosure requirements (disclos) capture all the information available for investors. If balance sheet has to
present a strict pattern we sum one unit to the index. If merger information must be public at the same
time it is communicated to authorities, we add one point. We sum one point for information requirements
to participate in stock markets. Finally, we sum an extra point when auditing is compulsory for all large
firms (not only firms participating in capital markets).
Disclosure requirements (disclos)
Strict Merger Stock
mkt
Auditing Total
AUSTRIA 1 1 1 1 4
BELGIUM 1 1 1 1 4
DENMARK 0 1 1 0/1* 2/3*
FRANCE 1 1 1 1 4
GERMANY 1 1 1 1 4
ITALY 1 1 1 0 3
NETHERLANDS 0 0/1* 1 1 2/3*
PORTUGAL 1 1 1 1 4
SPAIN 1 1 1 1 4
USA 1 1 1 1 4
*From 1993 the partial score is one and therefore the total value of disclos increased. It reflects a legal
change.
Legal Environment, Capital Structure and Firm Growth. International Evidence
41
TABLE 3:  LEGAL VARIABLES.
 Panel C:Banking Legislation.
Variable construction has done from comparative studies by InterBank Research Organization (1978) and
Parejo and Gamir (1992). Furthermore national legislations have been used. Innovations taken into
consideration since 1990. There are ten categories. License granting needed, necessity from community,
board of directors requirements, separation of activities, restriction to participations held in nonfinancial
firms and other financial entities respectively, restriction to own share holding, loan concentration risk
control, merger permision, restriction to branch opening and disclosure requirements.
Regulation
Procedure
Lisence
grant
Com.
need
Board
capabty
Separ.
activity
Particip.
Restrict.
Own
share
restrict.
Loan
concen.
Merger
control
Branch
control
Disclos .
Require. TOTAL
AUSTRIA 1 0 1 0 1+1 1 1 1 0 1 8
BELGIUM 1 1 1 0 1+0 0 1 1 0 0 (1)a 6 (7)a
DENMARK 1 0 1 1 1+1 1 1 1 0 1 9
FRANCE 1 1 1 0 1+0 0 1 1 0 1 7
GERMANY 1 0 1 0 1+0 0 1 1 0 1 6
ITALY 1 1 1 0 1+0 0 1 1 1 1 8
NETHERLANDS 1 0 1 0 1+0 0 1 1 0 1 6
PORTUGAL 1 0 1 0 1+0 0 0 1 0 1 5
SPAIN 1 0 1 0 0+0* 1 1 1 0 1 6
USA 1 1 1 1 1+1 0 1 1 1(0)b 1 10(9)b
Note: * Lowest limitation to non financial firm participations, therefore very weak control (almost non
existence).
a: values valid from 1993.
b: values valid from 1997.
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TABLE 4: LEGAL VARIABLES.
CRED ranges between 0 and 5, SHARE among 0 and 8. They captures creditor and shareholder
protection respectively. Higher values indicate better protection. DISCLOS measures the quantity of
information requirements.. Higher values of DISCLOS means higher information disclosure. BCA
captures banking regulation, it ranges from 0 to 10. Superior values are associated to stricter controls to
banking activity. All legal changes have been taken into account and included in the elaboration of the
variables.
CRED SHARE DISCLOS BCA
AUSTRIA 3 4 4 8
BELGIUM 3 1 4 6 (7)a
DENMARK 4 4 2(3)a 9
FRANCE 0 5 4 7
GERMANY 3 3 4 6
ITALY 2 1 3 8
NETHERLANDS 2 2 2(3)a 6
PORTUGAL 1 5 4 5
SPAIN 2 5 4 6
USA 1 8 4 10(9)b
Note:  a  It takes a value in brackets from 1993,  b  9 from 1997.
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TABLE 5: SUMMARY STATISTICS.
Panel A: Growth and external financing across industries.
To proxy for industry growth we use the geometric average rate of growth of real value added for each
industrial sector in each country between 1990-1999. To proxy for industry external financing needs we
use the ratio of credit with financial intitutions, trade credit and debenture loans over total assets.
avg. growth ext. finance
1 Energy 0.94 0.53
2 Ind. Sectors 0.97 0.56
3 Building 0.98 0.71
4 Trade 0.97 0.67
5 Transport 0.96 0.58
6 Other Services 1.01 0.59
21  Int.Products 0.97 0.51
22 Invest.Goods 0.97 0.58
23 Non.Dur.Goods 0.98 0.57
41 Whole.Trade 0.96 0.67
42 Motor Vehicles Trade 1.03 0.69
43 Retail Trade 0.98 0.66
44 Hotels 0.98 0.62
211 Metal.Extraction 0.94 0.57
212 Non-Metal.Extraction 0.98 0.51
213 Chemicals 0.97 0.51
221 Manuf.Of Metal 0.98 0.58
222 Electronic Equip. 0.95 0.56
223 Transport Equip Manuf. 0.97 0.62
231 Food 0.98 0.57
232 Textiles 0.95 0.57
233 Timber and Paper 0.99 0.58
234 Other Manuf. 0.99 0.57
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TABLE 5: SUMMARY STATISTICS.
Panel b: Growth and external financing across countries.
To proxy for industry growth we use the geometric average rate of growth of real value added for each
industrial sector in each country between 1990-1999. To proxy for industry external financing needs we
use the ratio of credit with financial intitutions, trade credit and debenture loans over total assets.
avg. growth ext. finance
Austria 0.97 0.682
Belgium 0.70 0.584
Denmark 1.06 0.615
France 1.00 0.663
Germany 0.99 0.598
Italy 1.03 0.650
Netherlands 1.01 0.540
Portugal 1.09 0.532
Spain 1.00 0.550
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TABLE 6: CORRELATIONS.
Lperca is the per capita income logarithm. Fd90 is the financial development. Enforce is the degree of
enforcement. Enfy is the corruption index. Share is the shareholder protection index. Disclos is the
disclosure requirement index. Bca is the banking regulation index and cred is the creditor protection
index.
lperca fd90 enforce enfy share disclos bca cred
lperca 1
fd90 0.4700* 1
enforce 0.5575* 0.4465* 1
enfy 0.3328* 0.4332* 0.5617* 1
share -0.3794* 0.4852* -0.2621* -0.1061 1
disclos -0.2559* 0.0327* -0.0258 -0.5022* 0.3062* 1
bca 0.6003* -0.0110 0.1004 0.0958 -0.1828* -0.3591* 1
cred 0.3885* -0.1142* 0.6607* 0.2453* -0.4387* -0.2762*  0.4103* 1
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TABLE 7: ESTIMATION OF THE BASIC TEST.
Results from the following empirical specification:
Growthj,k= a + ß1*Industry dummies j + ß2*country dummiesk + ß3*legal variable + ß4*financial
developmentk + ej,k
The dependent variable, growthj,k, is the average rate of growth of real value added for each industrial
sector in each country between 1990-1999. In specification (1) we include some country controls. fd90 is
a measure of the financial development in 1990, it is the ratio of domestic credit and stock market
capitalisation over GDP. Furthermore we introduce lperca90, which is the logarithm of per capita gdp in
1990 and enforce measures contract enforceability, rule accounts and enfy is a measure of the degree of
corruption in the country in 1990. Legal variables included are banking law (bca), creditor protection
(cred), shareholder protection (share) and disclosure requirements (disclos). Standard errors and t-
statistics are corrected for heteroskedasticity. Sector and size dummies used in both regressions. Country
dummies used in run (2).
(1) (2) (3)
fd90 0.1119*** 0.0000
(6.55) (.)
enforce -0.1115*** -0.1106***
(7.26) (7.23)
rule 0.1376*** 0.1238***
(27.69) (20.14)
enfy -0.1300*** -0.1129***
(17.47) (13.74)
lperca90 -0.0816***
(6.55)
bca -0.0527*** -0.0616*** -0.0415***
(20.90) (23.20) (7.32)
disclo -0.1659*** -0.1586*** -0.0931***
(25.36) (22.99) (27.10)
cred 0.0055 0.0076 0.0131**
(1.09) (1.47) (2.29)
share 0.0991*** 0.1086*** 0.0845***
(29.95) (46.16) (20.77)
Constant 0.6462*** -0.0729 0.2718***
(19.31) (0.67) (10.36)
Observations 520 520 520
R-squared 0.86 0.86 0.86
*indicates rejection of the null at the 10 percent significance level, ** indicates 5 percent significance
level and *** indicates 1 percent significance.
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TABLE 8: ESTIMATED ELASTICITIES.
For each country, we compute an estimate of the elasticity of the sector growth with respect to variation
in the legal development measures to assess the economic significance of the estimated coefficients in
specification (1) (column 2 of table 7). The elasticity is computed at the average value of the variables
National legal environment
bca disclos share cred
Austria -0.337 -0.383 0.348 0.040
Belgium -0.349 -0.528 0.120 0.056
Denmark -0.348 -0.175 0.318 0.049
France -0.286 -0.370 0.421 0.000
Germany -0.249 -0.376 0.256 0.040
Italy -0.319 -0.272 0.082 0.026
Netherlands -0.243 -0.184 0.167 0.026
Portugal -0.189 -0.086 0.389 0.012
Spain -0.246 -0.372 0.423 0.026
mean -0.285 -0.305 0.280 0.031
median -0.286 -0.370 0.318 0.026
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TABLE 9: INTERACTION ANALYSIS; FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND
LEGAL ENVIRONMENT.
Results from the following empirical specification:
Growthj,k= a + f1*Industry dummies j + f2*country dummiesk + f3* (national financial development*legal
variablek) + ej,k
The dependent variable, growthj,k, is the average rate of growth of real value added for each industrial
sector in each of the countries  between 1990-1999. The ratio measuring financial development (fd90)
includes of domestic credit and stock market capitalisation over GDP. Legal variables included are
banking law (bca), creditor protection (cred), shareholder protection (share) and disclosure requirements
(disclos). All scores for 1990. Standard errors and t-statistics are corrected for heteroskedasticity. Sector,
country and size dummies introduced.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
bca -0.0066* -0.0066* 0.0031
(1.87) (1.87) (0.89)
disclos 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(.) (.) (.)
cred 0.0000 0.0000 0.0153***
(.) (.) (5.91)
share 0.0340*** 0.0340*** 0.0347***
(7.23) (7.23) (7.25)
df90*bca -0.0099*** -0.0099*** -0.0074*** -0.0762***
(3.62) (3.62) (2.98) (19.81)
df90*discl -0.0184*** -0.0184*** -0.0181*** -0.0387***
(6.18) (6.18) (6.10) (10.27)
df90*cred 0.0127*** 0.0127*** 0.0738***
(5.91) (5.91) (34.17)
df90*share 0.0000 0.1503***
(.) (33.11)
Const -0.0094 -0.0094 -0.0116 -0.0465
(0.35) (0.35) (0.43) (1.53)
Obs 520 520 520 520
R-squared 0.86 0.86 0.855 0.84
*indicates rejection of the null at the 10 percent significance level, ** indicates 5 percent significance
level and *** indicates 1 percent significance.
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 TABLE 10.A: AMERICAN FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND LEGAL
ENVIRONMENT.
We calculate the estimated elasticity for the interaction term between legal factors and financial
development. First we use the national financial development. Then we substitute it for the American one.
In the last column, we compare national real growth rates with the predicted growth in case we replace
the national financial system with the American one. A positive (negative) sign implies significantly
greater (smaller) estimated growth. No sign indicates no significant mean difference.
National financial development American financial development diff.
bca disclos share cred bca disclos share cred
Austria -0.566 -0.144 0.274 0.419 -0.763 -0.194 0.369 0.549 +
Belgium -0.453 -0.154 0.073 0.447 -0.789 -0.267 0.127 0.758 -
Denmark -1.136 -0.128 0.489 0.996 -0.786 -0.089 0.338 0.670
France -0.654 -0.190 0.452 0.000 -0.646 -0.187 0.447 0.000
Germany -0.533 -0.180 0.258 0.525 -0.562 -0.190 0.272 0.540
Italy -0.318 -0.060 0.038 0.157 -0.722 -0.138 0.087 0.347 -
Netherlands -0.306 -0.052 0.099 0.201 -0.550 -0.093 0.178 0.352
Portugal -0.211 -0.021 0.204 0.083 -0.426 -0.043 0.413 0.164 +
Spain -0.424 -0.144 0.342 0.279 -0.556 -0.188 0.449 0.356 +
mean -0.511 -0.119 0.248 0.345 -0.644 -0.154 0.298 0.415 -
median -0.453 -0.144 0.258 0.279 -0.646 -0.187 0.338 0.356 -
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TABLE 10.B: FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND AMERICAN LEGAL
ENVIRONMENT.
We calculate the estimated elasticity for the interaction term between legal factors and financial
development. First we use the national legal environment. Then we substitute it for the American one. In
the last column, we compare national real growth rates with the predicted growth in case we replace the
national legal environment with the American one. A positive (negative) sign implies significantly greater
(smaller) estimated growth. No sign indicates no significant mean difference.
National legal environment American legal environment diff.
bca disclos share cred bca disclos share cred
Austria -0.566 -0.144 0.274 0.419 -0.708 -0.144 0.549 0.175 +
Belgium -0.453 -0.154 0.073 0.447 -0.756 -0.154 0.586 0.184 +
Denmark -1.136 -0.128 0.489 0.996 -1.262 -0.256 0.978 0.078 +
France -0.654 -0.190 0.452 0.000 -0.934 -0.190 0.724 0.101 +
Germany -0.533 -0.180 0.258 0.525 -0.888 -0.180 0.688 0.149 +
Italy -0.318 -0.060 0.038 0.157 -0.397 -0.081 0.308 0.249 +
Netherlands -0.306 -0.052 0.099 0.201 -0.510 -0.104 0.395 0.139 +
Portugal -0.211 -0.021 0.204 0.083 -0.421 -0.086 0.326 0.083 +
Spain -0.424 -0.144 0.342 0.279 -0.707 -0.144 0.547 0.140 +
mean -0.511 -0.119 0.248 0.345 -0.731 -0.149 0.567 0.144 +
median -0.453 -0.144 0.258 0.279 -0.708 -0.144 0.549 0.140 +
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TABLE 11: FINANCIAL DEPENDENCE AND LEGAL ENVIRONMENT.
Results from the following empirical specification:
Growthj,k= a + ß1*Industry dummies j + ß2*country dummiesk + ß3*(financial dependencej*legal variable)
+ ß4*financial developmentk + ej,k
The dependent variable, growthj,k, is the average rate of growth of real value added for each industrial
sector in each of the countries between 1990-1999. Legal variables included are banking law (bca),
creditor protection (cred), shareholder protection (share) and disclosure requirements (disclos). External
financial dependence (EFD) is a ratio of banking and trade credit and debenture loans on total assets,
Standard errors and t-statistics are corrected for heteroskedasticity. Sector and size dummies used in both
runs. Country dummies introduced in all specifications.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
bca -0.0210** -0.0419*** -0.0420*** -0.0344*** -0.0351***
(2.18) (5.53) (6.33) (4.22) (5.69)
disclos -0.0668*** -0.0589*** -0.0599*** -0.0925*** -0.0925***
(4.61) (3.97) (3.69) (5.69) (5.79)
cred -0.0118 0.0124 0.0139** 0.0113 0.0129*
(0.73) (0.57) (2.16) (0.55) (1.92)
share 0.0478*** 0.0574*** 0.0576*** 0.0846*** 0.0847***
(3.13) (4.89) (4.56) (16.86) (17.56)
FDE*bca -0.0347^ -0.0096 -0.0087 -0.0347^
(1.61) (0.68) (0.52) (1.61)
FDE*disc -0.0413* -0.0576** -0.0557** 0.0001 0.0002 -0.0413*
(1.65) (2.38) (2.34) (0.00) (0.01) (1.65)
FDE*shar 0.0644** 0.0468* 0.0464* 0.064**
(2.05) (1.96) (1.80) (2.05)
FDE*cred 0.0441* 0.0023 0.0025 0.0441*
(1.93) (0.09) (0.10) (1.93)
Cons 0.2602*** 0.2669*** 0.2461*** 0.2615*** 0.2616*** 0.0818*
(10.25) (10.29) (9.96) (10.13) (10.28) (1.84)
Obs 520 520 520 520 520 520
R-squared 0.8637 0.8623 0.8574 0.8562 0.8565 0.8610
*indicates rejection of the null at the 10 percent significance level, ** indicates 5 percent significance
level and *** indicates 1 percent significance.
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TABLE 12: FINANCIAL DEPENDENCE AND LEGAL AMERICAN
ENVIRONMENT. 1990-1999.
We calculate the estimated elasticity for the interaction term between legal factors and financial
dependence. First we use the national legal variables. Then we substitute them for the American ones. In
the last column, we compare national real growth rates with the predicted growth in case we replace the
national variables with the American ones A positive (negative) sign implies significantly greater
(smaller) estimated growth. No sign indicates no significant mean difference.
National variables American variables diff.
ni1
(EFD*
bca)
ni2
(EFD*
disclos)
ni3
(EFD*
cred)
ni4
(EFD*
share)
ni1
(EFD*
bca)
ni2
(EFD*
disclos)
ni3
(EFD*
cred)
ni4
(EFD*
share)
Austria -0.215 -0.244 0.026 0.221 -0.268 -0.244 0.009 0.443 +
Belgium -0.240 -0.311 0.033 0.071 -0.400 -0.311 0.011 0.565 +
Denmark -0.207 -0.104 0.029 0.189 -0.230 -0.208 0.007 0.379
France -0.176 -0.228 0.000 0.259 -0.251 -0.228 0.000 0.414 +
Germany -0.149 -0.226 0.024 0.154 -0.249 -0.226 0.008 0.410 +
Italy -0.212 -0.181 0.017 0.109 -0.265 -0.241 0.008 0.438 +
Netherlands -0.130 -0.098 0.014 0.089 -0.216 -0.196 0.007 0.357 +
Portugal -0.100 -0.182 0.006 0.207 -0.200 -0.727 0.006 0.330
Spain -0.138 -0.208 0.015 0.237 -0.230 -0.208 0.007 0.378 +
mean -0.174 -0.198 0.018 0.171 -0.257 -0.288 0.007 0.413 +
median -0.176 -0.208 0.017 0.189 -0.249 -0.228 0.007 0.410 +
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TABLE 13.A: SIZE ANALYSIS. SMALL AND MEDIUM SECTORS, 1990-1999.
The dependent variable, growthj,k, is the real value added growth between 1990-1999 on industry k and
country i at time t. FD is a measure of the financial development in 1990. It is the ratio of domestic credit,
and stock market capitalisation over GDP. Legal variables included are banking law (bca), creditor
protection (cred), shareholder protection (share) and disclosure requirements (disclos). External financial
dependence (EFD) is a ratio of banking and trade credit and debenture loans on total assets, Standard
errors and t-statistics are corrected for heteroskedasticity.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
bca -0.0089* -0.0143
(1.66) (0.69)
disclos 0.0000 -0.0761**
(.) (2.26)
cred 0.0000 0.0066
(.) (0.27)
share 0.0387*** 0.0560***
(5.88) (2.86)
df90*bca -0.0088** -0.0727***
(2.17) (14.14)
df90*disclos -0.0156*** -0.0393***
(3.58) (7.55)
df90*cred 0.0124*** 0.0705***
(4.31) (26.18)
df90*share 0.0000 0.1495***
(.) (25.07)
FDE*bca -0.0325 -0.0325
(0.77) (0.77)
FDE*disclos -0.0152 -0.0152
(0.25) (0.25)
FDE*cred 0.0110 0.0110
(0.31) (0.31)
FDE*share 0.0540 0.0540
(1.37) (1.37)
Constant -0.0706** -0.0678** 0.1614*** 0.0370
(2.02) (2.08) (5.07) (0.52)
Observations 341 341 341 341
R-squared 0.84 0.84 0.85 0.85
*indicates rejection of the null at the 10 percent significance level, ** indicates 5 percent significance
level and *** indicates 1 percent significance.
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TABLE 13.B: SIZE ANALYSIS. LARGE SECTORS, 1990-1999.
The dependent variable, growthj,k, is the real value added growth between 1990-1999 on industry k and
country i at time t. FD is a measure of the financial development in 1990. It is the ratio of domestic credit,
and stock market capitalisation over GDP. Legal variables included are banking law (bca), creditor
protection (cred), shareholder protection (share) and disclosure requirements (disclos). External financial
dependence (EFD) is a ratio of banking and trade credit and debenture loans on total assets, Standard
errors and t-statistics are corrected for heteroskedasticity.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
bca 0.0069** -0.0404***
(2.24) (4.11)
disclo 0.0000 -0.0631**
(.) (2.49)
cred 0.0000 -0.0105
(.) (0.78)
share 0.0270*** 0.0562***
(12.25) (2.83)
df90*bca -0.0151*** -0.0829***
(6.72) (36.60)
df90*disclos -0.0200*** -0.0373***
(7.73) (18.48)
df90*cred 0.0148*** 0.0804***
(6.86) (31.70)
df90*share 0.0000 0.1514***
(.) (39.91)
FDE*bca -0.0178 -0.0178
(1.10) (1.10)
FDE*disclos -0.0633 -0.0633
(1.60) (1.60)
FDE*cred 0.0506** 0.0506**
(2.09) (2.09)
FDE*share 0.0452 0.0452
(1.29) (1.29)
Constant 0.0940*** 0.0147 0.3401*** 0.0333
(4.06) (0.86) (10.99) (0.81)
Observations 179 179 179 179
R-squared 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94
*indicates rejection of the null at the 10 percent significance level, ** indicates 5 percent significance
level and *** indicates 1 percent significance.
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 TABLE 14: INDUSTRIAL SECTORS, 1990-1999.
The dependent variable, growthj,k, is the real value added growth between 1990-1999 on industry k and
country i at time t. FD is a measure of the financial development in 1990. It is the ratio of domestic credit,
and stock market capitalisation over GDP. Legal variables included are banking law (bca), creditor
protection (cred), shareholder protection (share) and disclosure requirements (disclos). External financial
dependence (EFD) is a ratio of banking and trade credit and debenture loans on total assets, Standard
errors and t-statistics are corrected for heteroskedasticity.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
bca -0.0064^ -0.0309***
(1.57) (2.98)
disclos 0.0000 -0.0759***
(.) (6.89)
cred 0.0000 -0.0133
(.) (0.82)
share 0.0293*** 0.0757***
(13.08) (8.02)
df90*bca -0.0068** -0.0713***
(2.58) (45.94)
df90*disclos -0.0165*** -0.0346***
(5.56) (16.42)
df90*cred 0.0099*** 0.0708***
(5.22) (36.66)
df90*share 0.0000 0.1450***
(.) (85.84)
FDE*bca -0.0792*** -0.1357*** -0.0017 -0.0017
(3.02) (12.57) (0.10) (0.10)
FDE*disclos 376 376 -0.0344* -0.0344*
0.91 0.91 (1.74) (1.74)
FDE*cred 0.0275 0.0275
(0.98) (0.98)
FDE*share 0.0047 0.0047
(0.28) (0.28)
Constant 0.1824*** -0.0997*** 0.2333*** 0.0531
(7.62) (9.95) (9.27) (1.45)
Observations 376 376 376 376
R-squared 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91
*indicates rejection of the null at the 10 percent significance level, ** indicates 5 percent significance
level and *** indicates 1 percent significance.
